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STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an action by the appellants (hereinafter
referred to as plaintiffs). Said plaintiffs prayed for a
preliminary injunction restraining and preventing the
respondents-defendants, Salt Lake County, its officers
and employees, from issuing any building or other permit which would effect property controlled by an ordinance which became effective on January 11, 1967,
which amended the zoning of 1.22 acres of property
located at the southeast corner of 2300 East and 4500
South, Salt Lake County, Utah, from Residential R-3
to Commercial C-1.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was decided by the trial court pursuant
to a hearing on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction. The court after hearing testimony and taking evidence introduced and after submission of memorandum by counsel and argument had thereon and the
court having made and entered its Finding of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, concluded that all the provisions and procedures required by Title 17-27-17, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and Title 8-1-9
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, were
duly and properly complied with in the amending of
said zoning ordinance to re-zone said premises from
Residential Rl3 to Commercial C-1, and that the tem·
porary restraining Order then in effect should be ya·
2

cated and the plaintiffs' Complaint dismissed together
\\·ith defendant and intervenor being awarded their
costs.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents-defendants seek reaffirmance of the
trial court judgment based on the record made before
the trial court and evidence contained therein as submitted to and heard by the trial court judge.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Bill Roderick, Inc., is the purchaser, of that certain
tract of real estate located on the southeast corner of
23rd East and 4500 South, within the Holladay planning district and is an intervenor-respondent in this
appeal. On or about the 3rd day of November, 1966,
the intervenor made application to amend the zoning
map of Salt Lake County by reclassifying said property from Residential R-3 to Commercial C-1. (Def. Ex.
D-20) This application was submitted to the Holladay
Planning District for its recommendation. On or about
Nov. 18, 1966, the Holladay District Planning Commission recommended approval of the application. The
1rritten recommendation was submitted subsequently to
the Salt Lake County Commission recommending approval, but conditioned that it conform to the Salt Lake
County master plan. (Pl. Ex. P-1).
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Salt Lake Planning Commission acted upon this
zoning ordinance and recommended disapproval of the
application. (Def. Ex. D-23) At the hearing by the
Planning Commission, two persons living within the
Holladay Planning District were in attendance and
made inquiry as to procedures to be followed thereafter.
(R. 144-146) Said representatives thereupon advised
the people in the area that the application had been
denied by the Salt Lake County Planning Commission
and that approval of said application was unlikely. (R.
146) Thereupon, the application was forwarded to Salt
Lake County Commission for its action, including the
recommendations made by the District Planning Board
and the Salt Lake County Planning Commission. Because of the recommendation of disapproval by the
Planning Commission, a public hearing was required
before action by the County Commission. A public
hearing on this application was scheduled to be held
on the 28th day of December, 1966, along with various other applications for changes of zoning. Notice
of said hearing was accomplished by posting a notice of
a change of zoning hearing on one public utility pole
near the intersection of 23rd East and 4500 South, in
front of the subject property. Another notice of the
proposed zoning change was posted on a utility pole in
front of the property owned by a lVIr. Hendricksen,
but near the subject property. (Def. Ex. D-56, R. 219·
220) A third notice of zoning was posted on a bulletin
board on the west entrance of the City and County
Building in Salt Lake City. (Def. Ex. D-55). A notice
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of said hearing of zoning change applications was
published along with other applications in the Salt Lake
Tribune on or about the 26th day of November, 1966.
(PL Ex. P-7)
A hearing in due course was held on the application and information was submitted to the commission
presenting facts justifying the change of zoning. Additional facts were submitted by other people in attendance at said hearing. (Def. Ex. D-35)
Said change of zoning was adopted unanimously
on December 28, 1966 after taking the matter under
advisement. (Def. Ex. D-37) Thereupon, the new
ordinance was submitted to the new county commission
pursuant to due course of business for signature.
(Def. Ex. D-39) Prior to the signature, sometime
after the enactment of the ordinance, plaintiffs and
appellants petitioned the county commission to rescind
its action, (Pl. Ex. P-48), and a meeting without
notice to applicant was held and the ordinance subsequently signed. This action to invalidate said ordinance
resulted thereby.
RESPONDENTS-DEFENDANTS POSITION
The trial court's decision should be affirmed for
the following reasons:
I. That all provisions and procedures required by

Title 17-27-17 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
'
amended, and Title 8-1-9 of the "Revised Ordinances
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of Salt Lake County" were duly and properly c .
r d .h .
om
P ie wit m the amending of said zoning ordinance
to re-zone said premises from Residential R-3 to Commercial C-1.
2. That the amended zoning ordinance is valid.
3. That the county commissioners did not act in
an arbitrary and capricious manner and that they proerly refused to rehear said matter pursuant to the petition of the appellants. That further, appellants' petition
for re-hearing was not based on any statutory procedures or by any authority of law.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SALT LAKE COUNTY PURSUANT TO
STATUTORY AUTHORITY HAS THE POWED TO AMEND ZONING ORDINANCES.
The legislature has delegated the power to zone
to Salt Lake County !'io that the need for a protective
plan might be met and has provided means for the pro·
tection of private property through notice and public
hearings. U.C.A. (1953), 17-27-1.
In pursuing its authority to zone a county, a
county commission shall perform a legislative function
and has wide discretion. The action of the zoning au·
thority is endowed with a strong presumption of validi·
ty and the courts will not interfere with a commission's
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action unless it clearly appears to be beyond its powers
or is unconstitutional. Gayland vs. Salt Lake County,
11 U. 2d 307, 358 P. 2d 633.
A presumption of validity and reasonableness attends zoning ordinances and amendments thereto. In
8 ftf cQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed. 559, Sec.
25.295, it is further said:
"The presumption of the reasonableness, validity and constitutionality of ordinances applies
fully to zoning ordinances and amendments of
zoning ordinances. Every intendment in favor
of their validity is to be indulged. This is particularly true since zoning is governmental and legislative in character, and constitutes an exercise
of the police power to promote the public welfare.
It is presumed that the zoning power has been
exercised reasonably by the zoning ordinance and
that the ordinance is for purposes and within the
scope of the police power. That is to say, it is
presumed that such an ordinance is designed to
promote the public welfare. The court will presume that in enacting a zoning ordinance the
(city council) acted with full knowledge of relevant conditions and circumstances ... "
POINT II
SALT LAKE COUNTY GAVE ADE(~UATE NOTICE OF THE HEARING TO BE
HELD DECEMBER 28, 1966, AS REQUIRED
BYLAW.
Section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, provides:
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"Before finally adopting any such amendment, the board of county commissioners shall
hold a public hearing th~reon, at least thirty
days' notice of the time and place of which shall
be given by at least one publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county and by
posting in three public places designed to give
notice thereof to the persons affected." (Emphasis added) .
Provisions in statutes requiring notice preparatory
to the enactment or amendment of zoning measures
typically provide for constructive rather than actual
notice as the publication in a local newspaper for a
specified number of times. Ordinances based pursuant
to them have been attacked as invalid in that without
actual notice the owner has been deprived of his property without due process of law. The courts have rather
uniformly held that this contention is groundless and
that the statute need not provide for nor the ordinances
be passed upon actual notice. See Wanamaker vs. City
Council of El Monte (1962) 200 Cal. App. 2d 453, 19
Cal. Rptr. 554.
Where the notice of a proposed rezoning hearing
is given, by a publication in a newspaper in accordance
with the State Statute, the fact that a property owner
effected by the rezoning did not read the particular newspaper in which the notice was published, does not invalidate the notice. Braden vs. Much ( 1949) 403 Ill.
507, 87 N.E. 2d 620. (Emphasis added)
The adequacy of particular newspaper publications of the notice required by various zoning statutes
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have been questioned in a number of instances. In absence of the particular statutory requirements, the
publications need not be given any special notoriety by
reason either of the size of print, location in newspapers
or number of publications. A single publication notice
prior to a hearing to amend a zoning ordinance was
held sufficient compliance with the statutory provisions
requiring at least fifteen days' notice in Central Realty
Corp. vs. Allison ( 1951) 218 SC 435, 63 S.E .2d 153.
"The tests which will generally determine the
questions of whether the notices were posted in
public places within the meaning of the statute is
whether the posting of the notices in the particular places fulfilled the purpose giving the publicity contemplated by the nature of the notice
required." Wann vs. Re-organized School Dist.
No. 6 of St. Francois County, 293 S.W. 2d 408,
413.

The United States Supreme Court in Mullane vs.
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 206
70 S. Ct. 652. ( 1950) acknowledged that the requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to appraise interested parties and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.
Section 17-27-17, of the Utah Code provides that
notice be given by posting in three public places designed to give notice thereof to the persons effected.
The following discussion illustrates that the Salt Lake
County Commission did observe the statutory mandate
and its notice requirements.
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(a) The County Did Use Adequate :Modes or
ltlanner of Giving Notice in Public Places as Required
by Law.
Salt Lake County pursuant to the above mentioned
statute posted notice in the Salt Lake Tribune on
or about November 26, 1966. Notices were also published in three public places located in Salt Lake
County. Mr. Preston E. Evans, employed by the Dt:partment of Zoning Administration of Salt Lake
County, testified, and in his testimony identified (Def.
Ex. D-55) , which was a notice of a zoning hearing and
testified that he posted a notice of hearing on the south
bulletin board of the west entrance of the City and
County Building on November 23, 1966. (R. 214-215)
Mr. Clair J. Hardman, also employed by the Department of Zoning Administration of Salt Lake
County, testified that he posted two notices of a zoning
hearing in this matter on two utility poles, one of which
was adjacent to the property, and the other about 200
feet south thereof, in Holladay, Utah. Mr. Hardman
was shown and he identified (Def. Ex. D-56) which indicated the location of two of the notices that were posted for the public hearing in this matter. (R. 219-220)
In Graham vs. Fitz ( 1876) 53 Miss. 307, the court
was concerned with the notice requirements pursuant
to a sale of property pursuant to a trustee's sale. The
court said on page 314:
"It was not the duty of the Trustee to make
daily and hourly observations of the three public
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places of the notices, so as to insure their remaining posted. It is not true that the displacement
of the posted notices by casualty or design would
invalidate a sale under them after they had been
duly posted .... The trustee under this deed of
trust, may lawfully sell on the day designated
without regard to the fact of wind or rain or some
mischievous or evil dispossessed person may have
removed one or all of the notices. Any other rule
would invalidate such sales. It would place in
the power of the mischievous or evilminded persons to defeat every proposed sale under such
deeds of trust. Any such rule is impractical,
impolitic, and title would be so insecure under
it as to forbid competition at such sales and lead
to the sacrifice of property."
( 1) Postings Were Made at Public Places as Required by Law.

The courts have held that the posting of notices
upon utility poles or fence posts located at the intersection of roads or on road boundaries as being sufficient and that these notices are as likely to be seen as
at any other place in the territory. The postings by
Salt Lake County were at three public places as required by law. State ew rel. Grant School Dist. vs.
School Board of Jefferson Joint School Dist. (1958)
4 'Vis. 2d 499, 91 N.W. 2d 219.
"Public places as applied to the requirements
of posting notices at public places are those
places that afford the most publicity r;;ithout
regard to the title owner .of the property. (~m
phasis added). See Whittingham vs. Hopkins,
54 A. 250, 69 N.J.L. 189.
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'Vhere a tree, post or similar object used for posting a notice is in a place exposed to traffic and the public view, posting thereon has been approved as compliance with public "place requirements." 90 A.L.R.
2d 1224.
Courts have also rejected the contention that because the telephone poles were private property and subject to removal by the owner at any time they could not
constitute public places. The court held that if a notice
is posted in a public place where the attention of the
public is likely to be attracted, the purpose of the law
is satisfied regardless of who may own the property on
which the notice is displayed.«» Mahon vs. Buechel
Sewer Const. Dist. No. 1 (1962, Ky.) 355 S.,V. 2d
683. (Emphasis added)
Government buildings, such as courthouses, town
halls, and post offices have frequently been held sufficiently public that a notice prominently posted on or
in such a building, satisfies the statutory requirements.
(Emphasis added) See 90 A.L.R. 2d 1218.
( 2) Postings Were Made at Three Public Places.
The county posted three notices at three public
places, to-wit: The south bulletin board on the west
entrance of the City and County Courthouse building,
the utility pole located at the intersection of 23rd East
and 4500 South adjacent to the property in question
and the utility pole approximately 210 feet south of the
(5) See also Schroeder vs. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), 83
S. Ct. 279.
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intersection at 4500 South and 23rd East adjacent to
the property owned by Mr. H. R. Hendricksen.
In Graham vs. Fitz ( 1876) 53 Miss. 307, the court
held that the requirement of notices to be posted in
three public places was also complied with where one of
the notices was posted on the inside of the post off ice
door which was closed every Sunday after 10 :00 a.m.
and another notice was posted on the Courthouse door
in the same town. The Courthouse and the post office
being within 150 yards of each other. The court stated,
"that if 150 yards is to be shown a distance to separate
two public places, what space shall be adopted as great
enough. The law has no rule on the subject."
Also in lJ;JcFarlane et al. vs. Witney (1940) 134
S.l\T. 2d 1047, the court upheld posting on a Courthouse and and a service station which was 400 feet from
the Courthouse; and the court stated in this case that
the property where the notices were posted were in no
way connected through ownership.
The plaintiffs in the above entitled matter question whether or not the notices posted by Salt Lake
County provided plaintiffs with proper notice of the
zoning proceedings. What could afford more notoriety than notices posted on or near the vicinity of the
property in question? The Supreme Court of Utah has
stated in the case of In Re. Phillips, Estate, 86 P. 358,
44 P. 2d 699, 703 (1035).
"An affirmative rule of what is sufficient depends so much upon the situation in every county,
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and perhaps the situation of the cases themselves,
that hard and fast rules cannot be enunciated."

Caldwell V8. Moffat (1919) 215 Ill. App. 583, held
that although the statute provided for posting of notices
in three of the most public places in town or district in
the vicinity of the road to be widened, altered, vacated
or laid out; even if the posting was not in strictly one
of the most public places in town, the failure to conform
to a strict construction of the law in respect to this one
particular notice was but a mere irregluarity and did
not destroy the jurisdiction of the highway commissioners. (Emphasis added)
( 3) The Places of Posting were Designed to Give
Notice Thereof to the Persons Affected as Required
by Law.

The person or persons charged with posting notices in public places must necessarily exercise and are
entitled to exercise at their discretion in the selection of
locations of the posts where these postings are in public
places and further, no one may complain that in his
judgment the notices should have been placed in other
public places. (5) And it is not important to that a notice
cannot be read by travelers while riding down the high(6) The Notice requirement pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated
(1953) 17-27-17, does not contain the language in three of the
most public places, but states only in three public places.
(7) Notice to those persons interested in the zoning proceedings
themselves would be in the vicinity of the property to be effected· and as cited supra, two of the public places namely
the t~o utility poles were located in the vicinity of the property in question. The courthouse which was ~electi;d as
the third public place seems a logical choice and is d~s1gned
to give notice thereof to the persons effected as required by
law.
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way in their automobiles and that no such requirement
is contemplated by the statute itself. It is further not
necessarily determinative of the question on the posting
that all of th notices can be read by one standing on the
highway or road. Wann vs. Re-organized School Dist.
(1956, Mo.) 293, S.W. 2d 408.
( b) The Legal Description Used by the County
iu the Notice of the Zoning Hearing was Adequate.
The boundaries of the legal description of the
property in question must only be described with reasonable certainty and with a definiteness sufficient for
identification. (Speroni vs. Board of Appeals of City
of Scerling, 368 Ill. 568, 15 N.E. 2d 302.) Zoning ordiwmces have been upheld, even though there have been
m:nor inadequacies in the description of the boundaries.
39 A.L.R. 2d P. 766.
Section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated, provides:
"That 30 days' notice of the time and place of which
shall be given by at least one publication in a newspaper
of general circulation in the county . . . " That on or
about November 26, 1966, Salt Lake County caused
to have published in the Salt Lake Tribune notice of
the zoning hearing of the subject property. Plaintiffs
in this action have made argument in their brief that
the description in the notice published by Salt Lake
County was inadequate. Zoning ordinances have been
upheld in several cases, even though there have been
mmor inadequacies in the description of the boundaries.
( ~ee Ciaffone, et al. vs. Community Shopping Corpora-
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lion, et al. 77 S.E. 2d 817. Speroni vs. Board of Appeals of City of Sterling, (1938) 368 Ill. 568, 15 N.E.
2d 302. The courts in these cases illustrated in their
reasoning that the requirement in the legal descriptions
pursuant to public notice is a test of whether or not
the description is reasonably certain and with a definiteness sufficient for identification.
Mr. Ralph Y. McClure, the zoning administrator
for Salt Lake County, and having been employed by
Salt Lake County about fifteen years, testified that it
was possible to locate the property pursuant to the description used by the County, and he further testified
that the property was described as reasonably as the description used on tax notices. In fact, he was asked the
following question: "Does it describe the property as
reasonable as the actual tax description?'' Answer:
"Well, it's my opinion it's easier to decipher our description than the tax notice's." ( R. 208, 209)
He further testified that the descriptions are not
the same as the tax notice descriptions for the fact that
most of the legal descriptions the county receives are
several descriptions and that the Salt Lake County Zoning Administration combines the descriptions into one
and describes just the subject property. (R. 209)
The courts have held on many occasions that the
subject property need not be described perfectly, so long
as the recipients of the notice can reasonably ascertain
from the description that the property in which they .
are interested may be effected by the enactment. In
1
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one c~se, an ordinance was held valid despite the fact
that the description of property affected by it was different from the property described in the notice pursuant to which it was passed. See Bregar vs. Britton
(1954, Fla.) 75 So. 2d 758, cert. den. 348 U.S. 972, 99
L. ed. 757, 75 S. Ct. 534. (By implication) The court
in this case pointed out that it appeared that the property affected by the ordinance was included in the
property described in the Notice.
The plaintiffs, in their brief at page 20, make mention of the effectiveness of newspaper publications and
cite a comment by Justice Black in the case of Walker
vs. Hulchinson, 852 U.S. 112, 116 (1956). That case
dealt with a condemnation of an individual's own property in a proceeding instituted by a City against a
landowner and that notice of the proceeding to determine the land owner's compensation was given only by
publication in the official City newspaper as authorized
by statutes then in force. The facts in the Walker Case
are far different than the situation in this matter and
the comments by J u!)tice Black would in no way be valid
law as to the fact situation in the present case. It can
well be understood why in a condemnation proceeding
against a landowner he was denied due process of law
by publication only in a newspaper. The plaintiffs and
appellants in this action in no way have a proprietary
or possessory interest in the subject property in the
above entitled matter located on the southeast corner
of 2300 East and 4500 South, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and they would not be subject to the same
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rules and principles of law as commented on by Justice
Black in the 'Valker case, as cited supra.
( c) The County Caused 'Vritings and Posted
Notices to be Exposed to View of the Public for the
Required Period of Time.
It is well established that notice was published in
the Salt Lake Tribune on or about November 26, 1966.
It has further been established that l\ir. Evans posted
one notice at the south bulletin board on the west entrance of the city and county building. (R. 215) It is
further established and uncontradicted, that .Mr. Hardman posted two notices on utility poles located at two
public places in Salt Lake County, Holladay, Utah.
(R. 218-219)

Plaintiffs' own witness, Mr. Marvin W. 'Vallen,
identified plaintiff's Exhibit Number 54 and testified
as to remnants of red markings peculiar to zoning notices posted on the above mentioned utility poles. (R.
174-175) Further Bill Roderick, Inc., intervenor, produced a witness, .Mr. Deon Leon Ekins, an uninterested
party in this action, (R. 107) who stated that he traveled
along 23rd East and 4500 South, Holladay, Utah, daily
during the period of November, 1966 through Christmas, 1966, that he and a friend were traveling along
23rd East just south of 4500 South, going skiing,
the vicinity of the subject propery, and that his friend
brought his attention to a notice of zoning change.
(R. 105) He ''"as asked the following question by
~fr. Everett E. Dahl: "You were able to see the zon-
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ing signs from your automobile?" Asnwer: "Uh huh"
(affirmative R. 106). He further stated, "We could
see them real good."
He was shown plaintiff's Exhibit Number 2, (the
type of zoning notice used by Salt Lake County and
containing the red markings) and he stated that he
remembered the red letters on the notice that he had
seen. (R. 106) l\fr. Ekins was further asked by the
court if he looked at the pole and the witness testified
that he did look at the pole. ( R. 11 O)
Plaintiff produced several witnesses all of whom
testified that they had not seen the notice~ that were
posted by Salt Lake County in the vicinity of the subject property.Negative testimony of witnesses is weightless as against positive witnesses of the defendant and
intervenor and does not prove that the notices were not
posted on the poles any more than the notice was not
published in the newspaper.
Plaintiffs raise the argument that Salt Lake County
in no way introduced any evidence as to the policing
of these notices by the County during this 30 day period
prior to the hearing itself. A reading of Section 17-2717, Utah Code Annotated, in no way sets forth the requirement of policing the notices posted by Salt Lake
County. This would raise an interesting problem in that
a property owner in the area that was adverse to the
zoning change could tear down the posted notices and
therefore defeat the posting period by his act. This
interpretation would seem to be unreasonable and im-
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practical. It appears that a reasonable and valid construction of the statute would be one that the statute
requires notice of at least 30 days in advance prior to
the hearing. This requirement it would appear contemplated a period of 30 days for interested parties and
parties to be affected by the zoning ordinance or zoning
amendment to be placed on notice of such hearing at
least 30 days in advance to allow them enough time for
their preparation to appear at the hearing and to be
heard. This interpretation seems reasonable in that the
statute only requires one notice to be published in the
newspaper an<l does not require the publishing of notices in the newspaper for each day during a thirty day
period prior to the hearing. It has heretofore been
argued that policing of these notices is not a requirement of law.

POINT III
THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY SALT LAKE
COUNTY IN THIS CASE MEET THE STATUTORY REQUIRElVlENT AND THE PROCEDURE AND ACTION PURSUANT THERETO AND AFFORDS EFFECTED PROPERTY
0 YV NE RS THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
The writer is aware that the United States Supreme Court has decided questions on this point as to
the due process of law issue. One of these decisions,
M,ullane vs. Central Hanover National Bank, 339 U.S.
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:306 ( 1950) which was also cited in plaintiff's brief, sets

forth the requirement of due process of law as being
one that affords to persons effected, notice reasonably
calculated under all the circumstances to appraise those
parties of the pending action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. This case involved
notice by publication to the beneficiaries of a common
trust fund and the court did consider the problem of
sufficiency of notice under the due process clause. It
should be pointed out that in this case they overruled
petitioner's objections to the violation of denial of due
process as to the published notice to those persons who
were unknown to the trustee. However, the court in
the Mullane case, as cited supra, states at page 59, "We
recognize the practical difficulties and costs that would
he attendant on frequent investigations of the status of
great numbers of 'beneficiaries' many of whose interest
in the common fund are so remote as to be ephemeral;
and we have no doubt that such impractical and extended services are not required in the name of due
process." (Emphasis added). The court, in this case,
further acknowledged that the Supreme Court of the
United States had not hesitated to approve the resorting to publication as a customary substitute in another
class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or practical to give more adequate warnings, i.e., where people
are missing or unknown. (Emphasis added) The requirement of notice of a public hearing prepartory to
the enactment of zoning measures has typically provided a constructive rather than actual notice, i.e., pub-
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lication in a newspaper. These statutes and ordinances
passed pursuant to them have on several occasions been
attacked as invalid and that without actual notice, the
owner has been deprived of his property without due
process of law. (Emphasis added) The courts have
uniformly held that this contention is without merit and
ihat the statute need not provide, nor the ordinance be
passed upon, actual notice.< 5) Plaintiffs' brief cites
Schroeder vs. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), 83 S.
Ct. 279. This again is a condemnation proceeding and
it is acknowledged by intervenor that some twenty-two
notices were posted on trees and poles in the general
vicinity of plaintiffs' property. However, the court in
that case was not impressed by the many places that
notices were posted, but stated at Page 282, "No such
sign was placed anywhere on the appellant's property."
The point to be made of this case is that this was a condemnation of an individual's own property and not a
case of general notice to many unknown individuals.
It should be further mentioned that the general
rule is that personal notice to property owners effected
by a zoning regulation or amendment is not a prerequisite to the valid enactment thereof; however, the zoning
enabling statute itself sometimes requires public notice
for a specified length of time and the holding of a public
hearing by the zoning commission. 58 Am. J ur. P. 944,
Sec. 10. Zoning.
(8) See 96 A. L. R. 2d P. 459. Several jurisdictions and court
cases are cited therein.
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The essence of the issue of whether or not the
requirement of due process of law has been met is
not the criterion of the possibility of conceivable injury, but the reasonable character of the requirements
having reference to the subject which the statute pertains. Mullane vs. Central Hanover National Bank
'
339 U.S. 306 (1950). As noted above in this brief,
we are concerned here with an exercise of a legislative
power delegated to the Salt Lake County Commission
and it should be noted that there is a fundamental
distinction, as regards due process of law, between
a legislative hearing and an adversary proceeding. It
is not necessary under the requirement of due process
of law chat interested parties be present at all stages
of the legislative deliberations. This requirement is
properly applicable only in adversary proceedings.
See Hart vs. Bayless Investment and Trading Company (1959) 346 P. 2d 1101. A point that should be

remembered in this case is that the plaintiffs in this
action are residents of the Holladay area, a few of
them are neighbors or living adjacent to the subject
property in this action. None of the plaintiffs have a
direct or proprietary legal interest in the subject property. Their only complaint is that of being affected
as residents of the area and subjected in this manner to
a zoning change of the subject property. The court in
Benner vs. Tribbitt, 190 Md. 6, 57 A2d 346, 353, stated,
"Exercise of the police power in zoning regulations
cannot be governed by a plebiscite of neighbors or for
their benefit."
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POINT IV
DEFENDANTS DID OBSERVE STATUT 0 R Y AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREl\'.IENTS.
Plaintiffs in their brief under Point IV, make
lengthy argument as to whether or not certain procedures were followed by defendant and whether or not
Bill Roderick, Inc., was a proper applicant. This issue
is improperly before the court on appeal and should be
summarily dismissed on the basis that nowhere in plaintiffs' complaint, ( R. 1), is this issue raised and further
nowhere in the Trial Record was this issue heard or
determined by the lower court.
However, it should be pointed out that Mr. William
C. Roderick, President of Bill Roderick, Inc., appeared
before the court on the 4th day of May, 1967, at the
hour of 10 :00 a.m.; ( R. 250) , he testified that he began
negotiating pursuant to the purchase of the property in question located at 2300 East 4500 South, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah; and that the actual closing was consummated on November 23, 1966. At
that time a Uniform Real Estate Contract was entered
into by respondent and intervenor. He further testified
that he had also entered into an Earnest Money Agreement prior to the execution of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract (R. 251). The hearing on the 4th day of May
was for the purpose of determining a bond that would be
required to be posted by the plaintiffs in order to restrain
the defendants from further action in this matter while
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the above entitled action was on appeal to the Supreme
Court of Utah. The lower court did issue an order and
finding that the plaintiff would be required to file with
the clerk of the court a security in the amount of
$G,500.00, for payment of such costs and damages as
may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found
to have been wrongfully restrained. This was signed
by the lower court on the 18th day of May, 1967. (R.
38, 39) The Order Vacating the Temporary Injunction and the Dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint was
signed on the 17th day of April, 1967, (R. 31) and the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were also
entered by the court on said date. (R. 33, 34, 35, 36,
and 37) Nowhere in said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law appears the issue as argued by the
plaintiffs in this matter.
Plaintiff further complains that the ordinance
is invalid on the basis that certain procedures within
the planning commission were not followed in that the
list of the property owners within 150 feet of the subject
property were not furnished and that no statements
were furnished from the property owners in the vicinity
expressing their position on the proposed change of
zoning. Now here in the State Statutes, nor in the
County Ordinances themselves, is any such requirement
set forth. The procedures complained of must be
information that the planning staff likes to have in
arriving at their recommendations. Failure to comply
with these requirements is not jurisdictional nor man-
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datory in the zoning procedures. Caldwell vs. Moffatt,
215 Ill. App. 583, (1919).
POINT V
DEFENDANT COM.MISSIONERS' ACTIONS \VERE REASONABLE AND SAID
ACTIONS WERE NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS.
In pursuing its authority to zone a county, a county
commission shall perform a legislative function and has
wide discretion. The action of the zoning authority is
endowed with a strong presumption of validity and the
courts will not interfere with a commission's action
unless it clearly appears to be beyond its powers or is
constitutional. Gavland vs. Salt Lake County, 11 U. 2d
307, 358 P. 2d 633. Also a presumption of validity and
reasonableness attends zoning ordinances and amendments thereto. 8 McQuillin, _Municipal Corporations,
3rd Ed. 559, Sec. 25.295.
Even though it may be true that there was informa·
tion presented to the commission for denial of the
amending of the zoning ordinances or as advocated by
the plaintiffs in this matter, is is also true that informa·
tion was presented by Bill Roderick, Inc., the inter·
venor and respondent, in favor of the change of zoning.
The evidence in the possession of the planning commis·
sion and before the county commission, was not intro·
duced into evidence and the matter of reasonableness
of the determination by the County Commissioners was
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not an issue during the trial. (Emphasis added (R. 213)
lt is not the prerogative of the court to substitute its
judgment for that of the county commission. Parkinson
vs. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, 291 P.2d 400, and Gayland
vs. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633.
(a) In Refusing to Permit Certain Property
Owners a Rehearing on the Zoning Ordinance Which
Had Been Enacted In This Matter, the Defendant
Commissioners Acted in a Reasonable Manner and Did
Not Act Arbitrarily or Capriciously.
This court has previously held that it would not
intervene in the wisdom of the subject legislative action.
Gaylen vs. Salt Lake County, supra. There was not sufficient evidence to even raise the issue of arbitrary and
capriciousness of the county commission in the lower
court (R. 213) The plaintiffs did raise an issue of arbitrary and capricious action in the commission's failure to
rescind its action taken on January 11, 1967, (Def. Ex.
D-39) pursuant to a petition presented to the defendant commissioners on January 10, 1967, (Pl. Ex.
P-48), which was nothing more than an ex-party proceeding instituted by the plaintiffs. The procedure
taken is not provided for by statute and again only
goes to the merits of the wisdom of the legislative action
taken by the commission. The mere fact that many
names were procured on a petition objecting to the action of the commission is no evidence of the wisdom of
the leaislative
action taken. It affects only legislative
b
expediency which may be considered by the commis.sion.
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Plaintiffs further contend that the planning commission acted in recommending a denial of the zoning
change prior to its receipt from the Holladay District
Planning Commission. It should be noted that the
recommendations of the Holladay Planning Commission were merely advisory and its recommendation did
not have any particular bearing upon the planning commission's action because the planning commission recommended denial of the zoning change whereas the
llolladay District Planning Commission had recommended favorable action. Both the report of the Holladay District Planning Commission and the report of
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission were submitted to the Salt Lake County Commission, who
eventually made the fina] decision concerning the
zoning.
There is very little evidence in the record concern·
ing the facts dealing with the property in question, and
the facts either justifying the zoning or not justifying
ihe zoning of the subject property, except that plaintiffs
and persons signing the petition were opposed to it. In
order for a court of law to substitute its judgment for
the county commission, the evidence must be clear and
convincing that the commission acted arbitrarily and
capriciously. The plaintiffs conceded during the trial
on a direct query from the trial judge that there was
no issue to arbitrariness and capriciousness as to the
action taken by the county commission. Plaintiffs' only
claim to arbitrariness and capriciousness was their
assertion that the county commission did not reconsider
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and call an additional public hearing on the matter.
The petition was filed with the county commission setting forth plaintiffs' objections to the zoning prior to
the final action by the county commission in enacting
the recommendations of the planning commission,
which already were before the commission. (R. 213)
(b) The Re-zoning of the Subject Property was
Reasonable and Constitutional.
The subject property is located at the intersection
of 2300 East and 4500 South, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and is bounded on three sides by public streets.
It is well to point out to the court that on page 42 of
the Mr-,Jter Plan of Salt Lake County, (Def. Ex. D-42)
the provision for the interstate system and access roads
in the Big Cottonwood District is specified as follows:
"Circulation within the District will be provided in the future by the planned system of
expressways and major arterials which will include 700 Eas Street; the Cottonwood Expressway; 2300 East Street; and 4500 South Street;
all to be improved to provide adequate traffic
capacity."
The evidence concerning the facts surrounding the
zoning is not included in the record on appeal because
there was no genuine issue as to whether or not the
zoning was reasonable or proper but the issue at trial
followed the argument as to whether or not proper
notice was given of the public hearing, thereby granting
to the complaining parties, the plaintiffs, herein, a right
to appear and oppose the matter prior to the decision
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by the Salt Lake County Commission. The defendants.
respondents' position is that inasmuch as said notice
complied with the statutes in each respect, that the
rezoning of the property, by the Salt Lake County
Commission, was correct and that it was reasonable
insamuch as it was based upon the facts and evidence
presented by all parties at the time of the hearing,
which was noticed up according to statute.
It is well to note at this point that the Supreme
Court has consistently ruled that courts will not substitute their judgment for a governmental body charged
with the enactment of legislation. The defendant-respondents' position is that the plaintiffs herein improperly challenged the question of reasonableness, and we
merely offer a counter argument that it was appropriate and reasonable and therefore constitutional.

( c) The Re-zoning of the Subject Property 1s
Grounded Upon Reason and Based on the Policy of the
Statute.
Plaintiffs contend under this section of their brief
that the zoning change constituted "spot zoning," and
that Commissioner Blomquist was prohibited by law
from signing the zoning ordinance. This specific issue
did not come up at trial. This is merely a matter of
argument raised in the first instance with this appeal.
There are not sufficient facts in this record on appeal
for the court to attempt to substitute its judgment for
the County Commission. The burden of proof rests on
those challenging the validity of the ordinance and as
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stated in 8 lVIcQuillan, Municipal Corp., 3d Ed. 559,
Sec. 25.296, page 562.
"T~e rule that the burden of proof is on one

asser~mg. the ~mreasonableness, invalidity or un-

conshtuhonahty of an ordinance is applicable
with respect to zoning ordinances and amendments thereto. Leastwise, where a zoning ordinance is not invalid on its face, the burden of
alleging and proving facts to support the claim
of its invalidity is on the party asserting it. ***
Consistently, there is no burden on a municipal
corporation to show facts establishing the validity of zoning."
''The burden of proof on one asserting the
invalidity of a zoning ordinance extends to the
issue of whether or not the ordinance will promote the public safety, health, morals, order,
welfare, prosperity or convenience, and it extends to the issue whether or not the classification
made by the ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary
or discriminatory.***"
The trial of this case was conducted primarily on
the issue of the notice given by the Salt Lake County
Commission for a public hearing on December 28, 1966.
The problem of spot zoning was given nothing more
than lip service. The district re-zoned is relatively
a large tract, exceeding one acre, completely surrounded by three public highways, two of which are heavily
traveled streets and projected to become major arterial
highways. There is a condominium, Carriage Lane, almost across the street and the old established business
district a very short distance from the property and
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a public school planned for construction within a very
short distance to the East of the property.
The Supreme Court of Oregon in 1954 in Shaffner
vs. City of Salem, 268 P.2d 599, had occasion to decide
a similar case of spot zoning concerning a service station. This court cited l\lcMullin on Municipal Cor·
porations as cited above.
Plaintiffs have also attempted to make certain
improper inferences as to Mr. Roderick and Com·
missioner Blomquist on the basis that Mr. Roderick
said that he knew Commissioner Blomquist businesswise. ( R. 254) These allusions in the brief serve no
useful purpose on the appeal of the issues in this case,
except in an attempt, perhaps, to insinuate that the
zoning change was accomplished by unsavory and unbusinesslike methods and that the obtaining of the
zoning was improperly done. The zoning ordinance
was acted upon and approved by a commission composed of Commissioners Larson, Jenson and Creer.
prior to two of them leaving office at the conclusion
of the year 1966. The ordinance was acted upon by
Commissioners Blomquist and Hanson shortly after
they assumed office. There is nothing in the record on
appeal that justifies such a suggestion by the plaintiffs
as respects Commissioner Blomquist, one of the de·
fendants-respondents. As a closing point:
The Linden Methodist Episcopal Church vs. Linden,
cited on page 54 of plaintiffs' brief, is not in point. In
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that particular case, the applicant for change of zoning
was actually a member of the zoning committee, and the
changes of zoning that said applicant requested were
passed on by the other councilmen on this committee,
solely on the basis that he had served faithfully to the
city for six years and deserved something. Further, in
that case there was no evidence or testimony presented
to said council. This is far removed from the situation
in the present case.
(d) (See below.)
(e) The defendant-respondents consider the subtitles of paragraph ( d) and ( e) of Point V in said
plaintiffs' brief to be more in the nature of argument
and conclusion and are not therefore considered further,
as it has been amply covered in the brief heretofore.

CONCLUSION
It is a clear statutory construction that any questions as to the validity of an ordinance or its application in any case must be resolved with a presumption
of the validity of said ordinance. As indicated in the
brief, action such as the rezoning amendment herein
are legislative actions by properly elected governing
body, in this case, the Salt Lake County Commission.
The action of such a legislative body, having complied
with the ordinances, carries with it a presumption of
validity.
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The defendants-respondents' conduct and actions,
as part of these legislative proceedings, were proper
in every way as to procedure, notice, and due process.
The burden of showing that this ordinance is invalid is very heavy upon plaintiffs and their evidence
must be so convincing and overwhelming as to remove
any doubtfulness as to the validity of the ordinance.
This procedure also affects not only this zoning ordinance, but perhaps some twelve hundred other zoning ordinances passed since the adoption of the basic statutory
laws pertaining to zoning. The upsetting of this particular zoning ordinance would place in doubt all other
zoning ordinances passed by the Salt Lake County
Commission.
The Holladay District Planning Commission acted.
The Salt Lake County Planning Commission acted.
A public hearing was noticed up along with others
within the county. The hearing was held before the Salt
Lake County Commission. After due consideration
the commission acted and thereupon the legislative
process in such matters was fulfilled in good faith.
Some of the issues are not properly before the
court on appeal. The trial judge allowed plaintiffs full
opportunity to present its case and had benefit of receiving both oral and written arguments. It is rather basic
on appeal that whenever there is a conflict of evidence
on a particular issue the respondent is entitled to have
the issue reviewed in a light most favorable to that find·
ing. The decision of the lower court should be affirmed.
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